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ABSTRACT This article discusses the use of institutional theory in management accounting
research. Three different types of institutional theory are described and their use in studying
management accounting change is explained: new institutional economics (NIE), new insti-
tutional sociology (NIS) and old institutional economics (OIE). Whereas NIE and NIS study
how external economic and institutional (i.e., social and political) pressures influence the
way organisations are structured and the nature of their management accounting and
control practices, OIE focuses on the institutions (ways of thinking) within organisations and
the internal pressures and constraints that shape management accounting practices. It is
recognised that management accounting change is a complex and multi-dimensional pro-
cess, and it is shown that institutional theory can highlight the different aspects of the
‘mish-mash’ of inter-related influences. Furthermore, it is explained how taken-for-granted
ways of thinking within an organisation can have a direct and important impact on the
success (or failure) of a programme of management accounting change.
RELEVANCE FOR PRACTICE Institutional theory shows how differences in the prevailing
ways of thinking (i.e., institutions) within organisations can be a source of resistance to
programmes of management accounting change. Questions which should be asked when
embarking on a programme of management accounting change are suggested in the article.
1 Introduction
Various theories are used by researchers to study manage-
ment accounting change. In an editorial reviewing the
papers published in the first 20 years of the international
research journal Management Accounting Research (1990-
2009), it was pointed out that a large number of theories
have been used, but the most used in the period 2000-2009
was institutional theory (Scapens and Bromwich, 2010).
Although it was only used by 19% of the papers published
in the journal, it is the theory that is most extensively
used in studying management accounting change. It is
also widely used by organisational researchers in studies
of organisational change. Broadly there are three different
types of institutional theory: new institutional economics
(NIE) which is concerned with the governance of econo-
mic transactions; new institutional sociology (NIS) which
is concerned with the institutions in the organisational
environment which shape organisational systems and
practices; and old institutional economics (OIE) which is
concerned with the institutions that shape the actions
and thoughts of actors within organisations.
Whereas NIE extends the traditional economic approach
and applies the assumptions of economic rationality and
markets to the governance of organisations, OIE starts
from a rejection of the neoclassical economic core and
seeks to explain the behaviour of economic agents in
terms of rules, routines and institutions. NIS, however,
starts by asking why organisations look similar and what
are the pressures and processes which shape organisa-
tions. The following sections will describe these three
types of institutional theory in more detail. The subse-
quent section will then outline some practical implica-
tions of institutional theory for the implementation of
management accounting change.
Management accounting change is a complex and multi-
dimensional process which requires careful planning and
thoughtful implementation. Furthermore, management
accounting practices evolve over time and are subject to a
wide array of influences. As the management accountant
in a relatively small operating unit of a large UK-based
multinational commented about how practices had devel-
oped in his company:
“Well it is, you see, how things evolve. I suppose in the
academic world it’s all clear cut, but it isn’t really, you
know. When you come down here, it’s all a hell of a
big mish-mash, all inter-related influences. It’s not
clear-cut and logical. It looks completely illogical, but
that’s how it happens. And I’m sure we’re no different
from any other outfit. And you’ll go back and say
‘What a load of idiots!’ But that’s how it happens.”1
This comment emphasises that there is considerable com-
plexity and lots of ‘things going on’ in any organisation
which, when looked at from the outside, may appear il-
logical. But it is this mish-mash of inter-related influ-
ences that shape management accounting practices, and
thus in studying management accounting change we
must try to understand this mish-mash. Clearly, there
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are broad economic, social and organisational trends that
affect the way in which firms and their management ac-
counting practices emerge. But in addition, there will also
be unique factors, relating to the specific organisation,
which shape its management accounting practices. To un-
derstand these practices, we need to study the interplay of
the broad systematic trends and the unique idiosyncratic
factors - i.e., the mish-mash of inter-related influences. It
is here that institutional theory can help us understand
management accounting practices.
2 New Institutional Economics (NIE)
New institutional economics encompasses a broad range
of economic approaches which have developed out of neo-
classical economics. Although the traditional theory of the
firm treated the firm as a black box, by the mid twentieth
century managerial and behavioural theories of the firm
had begun to look inside the box. NIE followed this lead
and sought to explore the governance arrangements
which structure economic activities within firms and or-
ganisations more generally. There are various strands of
NIE, including work in such areas as property rights and
common law, public choice processes, as well as work
within organisations; and a number of different theoreti-
cal approaches have been developed, including agency the-
ory, game theory and transaction cost economics (TCE). A
detailed discussion of the various types of NIE is beyond
the scope of this article; here we will focus primarily on
TCE as it has had a significant influence on accounting
research, especially management accounting research.
NIE uses economic reasoning to explain diversity in the
forms of institutional arrangements. Williamson’s (1975)
work on Markets and Hierarchies provided a bridge between
the managerial and behavioural theories of the firm, and
it contributed significantly to the development of TCE.
The essence of Williamson’s work is that markets and
firms (hierarchies) are alternative means of organising
economic transactions - i.e., alternative governance struc-
tures. The extent to which transactions are conducted
within the firm, rather than through markets, depends
on the relative transaction costs associated with each go-
vernance structure. Certain characteristics of transactions,
namely environmental uncertainty, asset specificity and
frequency of transactions, influence transaction costs. To
explain differences between markets and hierarchies, TCE
adopts a rational economic approach, with assumptions of
bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 1975;
see also 1985). Bounded rationality refers to the computa-
tional limitations of human actors - they have both lim-
ited information and limited informational processing
capabilities. Opportunism implies seeking self interest with
guile (Williamson, 1985, p. 47); in other words, human
actors behave opportunistically in pursuing their self-in-
terest.
Transactions will take place within hierarchies (i.e., organ-
isations) when transaction costs are lower than in mar-
kets. Given the assumptions of bounded rationality and
opportunism, it has been recognised that it may be im-
possible to organise economic transactions exclusively by
contracts, either within the firm or in markets. This leads
economists to study such problems as moral hazard and
adverse selection. These problems arise from different
types of information asymmetries2 and their effects can
be minimised by the use of appropriate governance struc-
tures, including monitoring mechanisms such as man-
agement control systems. Various management account-
ing researchers have used such economic reasoning to
study the management control systems used in different
types of organisations (see for instance, Van der Meer-
Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000; and Speklé, 2001).
NIE has drawn attention to the economic factors which
shape organisational structures and also control systems
and management accounting practices. As mentioned
above, TCE was initially developed to explain why some
transactions take place within hierarchies, while others
take place within markets. For example, in situations
where there is uncertainty, high levels of asset specificity
and frequent transactions, economic transactions are
likely to be conducted within a hierarchy; whereas if there
is little uncertainty, few specific assets and relatively infre-
quent transactions, economic transactions are likely to be
conducted through the market. However, between these
two extremes there may be hybrid structures, such as
joint ventures, strategic alliances, supply chains and so
on, which provide alternative governance structures.
Much of the recent work using TCE has focussed on such
hybrid governance structures. Similarly, although the
early work using TCE in management accounting re-
search was concerned with explaining the historical emer-
gence of firms and their management accounting systems
(see for example, Johnson, 1983), more recent work has
attempted to use transaction cost reasoning to explain the
diversity of management control and accounting systems
(e.g., Speklé, 2001), particularly in new organisational
forms - i.e., hybrid governance structures. The studies ap-
plying NIE to management control in such organisations
have pointed to the need to understand the use of man-
agement accounting in lateral, as well as vertical, relation-
ships (Vosselman, 2002; see also Van der Meer-Kooistra
and Scapens, 2008).
As the above references indicate, there is a significant
group of Dutch researchers who have used TCE to study
management accounting. Speklé (2001) used TCE to set
out nine different control archetypes which are appropri-
ate for certain types of organisational activities, but not
for others. As such, TCE is used to describe the governance
structures (i.e., control systems) which are appropriate for
specific types of organisational activities. Furthermore,
Thema
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TCE has been used by Dutch researchers to explore man-
agement controls in inter-organisational relationships.
For example, TCE has been used by Dekker (2003, 2004 and
2008) to study the control mechanisms, such as contracts,
monitoring systems and incentive/reward systems, which
can deter opportunistic behaviour and align the interests
of parties in inter-organisational relationships. In addi-
tion, Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman used TCE to
study the design of management control structures for
inter-firm transactional relationships. A particular feature
of their work is that they combine TCE with notions of
trust in studying various types of hybrid governance
structures (see Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman,
2000 and 2006; Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra,
2009; see also Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2007
on the management control of joint venture).
As indicated above NIE developed out of neoclassical eco-
nomics and as such NIE brings institutions into main-
stream economic analysis. It allows economic reasoning to
be used to explain governance structures and it can be
used to provide economic explanations for management
control and management accounting systems and prac-
tices. In this context institutions are the governance struc-
tures which are used to organise economic transactions -
or to shape/constrain economic activity. As Hodgson
(1999, p. 34)3 noted: “it is a defining characteristic of the
‘new’ institutional economics that institutions act pri-
marily as constraints upon the behaviour of given indivi-
duals”. As such, a key difference between NIE and OIE
(which will be described in more detail below) is that,
whereas OIE seeks to explain the nature and formation of
institutions, NIE tends to treat them as determined by
the characteristics of the transactions. Nevertheless, de-
spite these differences, NIE and OIE both recognise that
institutions are important, and that they tend to be ig-
nored in more orthodox economics. But whereas OIE
treats institutions as taken-for-granted assumptions which
exist at the cognitive level (see below), NIE regards insti-
tutions as the external rules or constraints that shape
economic behaviour.
To summarise, NIE draws attention to the economic fac-
tors which shape the structure of organisations and their
management accounting practices. As such, it can be help-
ful in understanding certain aspects of the mish-mash of
inter-related influences. However, economic factors are
only part of this mish-mash and we need to look beyond
economics to get a fuller understanding of all the inter-
related influences. In the next section we will discuss how
NIS can be helpful in this respect.
3 New Institutional Sociology (NIS)
The early NIS research was concerned with why organisa-
tions, particularly not-for-profit and public sector organi-
sations, in particular fields appear to be quite similar. The
early NIS theorists distinguished between technical and
institutional environments, and argued that they each
place different pressures on organisations (see Meyer and
Rowen, 1977). The former relate to the need to achieve
technical efficiency in the operations of the organisation,
while the latter relate to the need to embrace the rules,
social norms and expectations of others outside the orga-
nisation. In this context, organisations have to appear le-
gitimate to their broader constituencies and stakeholders
in order to secure the resources they need for their con-
tinued survival. To gain this legitimacy organisations
have to be seen to conform to what is expected of them
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983)
To explain this conformance NIS focussed on different
types of isomorphism - coercive, mimetic and normative.
Isomorphism is the process through which one organisa-
tion tends to resemble others in the same (organisational)
field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p. 66). Coercive iso-
morphism occurs due to political and regulative influ-
ences; mimetic isomorphism occurs when organisations
seek to copy the practices of other successful organisa-
tions; and normative isomorphism when the norms of
society and professional bodies influence the practices of
organisations. Competitive isomorphism through the in-
fluence of market forces was not dismissed, but the em-
phasis on the three types of institutional isomorphism
highlighted the social and political dimensions of the en-
vironment in which organisations are located. This early
NIS work tended to emphasise the structural nature of
institutions. In other words, how organisations are
moulded by institutional forces: forces which are external
to the organisation. Rather less attention was given to the
way in which institutions are created and how institu-
tions change. It was generally argued that in order to
protect the technical core of their activities – i.e., their
primary operations – organisations loosely couple their
operational systems and the systems they use to respond
to the external institutional pressures. This loose coupling
was usually seen as a rather passive organisational re-
sponse. However, some institutional theorists argued that
organisations are not necessarily passive; they can act stra-
tegically in their response to institutional pressures (see
Oliver 1991). As such, they may purposefully comply with
external requirements by adopting specific formal struc-
tures and procedures, but in a strategic and manipulative
fashion, in order to gain legitimacy and thereby secure
the resources which are essential for their survival.
The recent work in NIS, however, has begun to explore
the processes which shape practices within organisations,
and as such NIS research has become concerned with the
processes through which organisations respond to exter-
nal institutional pressures. This has moved the focus of
NIS away from processes of isomorphism and questions of
why organisations appear homogenous, and towards the
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processes which shape practices within individual organi-
sations (and organisational fields) and give rise to organi-
sational heterogeneity. For example, Lounsbury (2007,
2008) calls for a greater focus on practice variations. He
argues that different logics can shape organisational re-
sponses to institutional pressures and consequently there
can be variations in the way they respond. This does not
mean that these responses are irrational; on the contrary,
they can be quite rational given the particular logic(s)
within the organisation and the organisational field. Such
research has notable similarities with the way in which
OIE has been used in management accounting research,
as we will see below. However, first we will look at the
management accounting research which has drawn on
NIS.
The management accounting researchers who adopted the
early NIS approach used the concept of loose coupling to
study the apparently ‘non-rational’ and often ceremonial
use of accounting information, especially in the public sec-
tor. Loose coupling occurs when accounting practices,
which are introduced to meet institutional requirements,
are used in a ceremonial way: i.e., decoupled from the con-
trol systems used to manage the technical core of the orga-
nisation. Examples of such an NIS approach to the study of
management accounting practices include the work of
Covaleski and Dirsmith (1983, 1988) and Covaleski, et al.
(1993) who studied public sector budgeting and case-mix
accounting in US hospitals; Modell (2001) who studied new
public management in Norwegian health care (see also
Brignall and Modell, 2000, who contrasted public sector re-
forms in the UK and Sweden); and Collier (2001) who stu-
died local financial management in a British police force.
By recognising the way in which organisations tend to
conform to what they perceive as the expectations of their
broader environment, such research has provided useful
insights into the social and political factors which shape
management accounting practices within organisations.
However, the early studies tended to focus on the institu-
tional environment and paid relatively little attention to
the technical environment, even though some NIS writers
recognised that the institutional and technical aspects of
organisational behaviour are inter-related (e.g., Powell,
1991). For example, the implementation of ABC may be
driven by technical concerns to achieve the most appro-
priate allocation of overheads for economic decision mak-
ing, but it may also be driven by the desire to conform to
external expectations and to appear to be adopting the
modern techniques which are used by other organisa-
tions. In such situations, it may be difficult to disentangle
these two types of organisational conformance.
More recent studies question the earlier emphasis on
loose coupling, especially the assumption that loose cou-
pling is a rather passive and somewhat automatic organi-
sational response. For example, a case study of the devel-
opment of performance measurement in the Swedish uni-
versities’ sector by Modell (2003) showed that loose cou-
pling emerged over time as a result of conflicts and power
struggles between various actors in the institutional field.
Furthermore, a case study of a public utility in Malaysia
by Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007) showed how contradic-
tory institutional pressures for both greater efficiency and
improved public service can generate conflicts and resis-
tance inside an organisation which lead to the loose cou-
pling of operating systems and financial control systems.
This study illustrated the importance of studying the way
actors within an organisation respond to institutional
pressures from outside (see also Modell, 2005 and
Østergren, 2006). Some management accounting research-
ers who use NIS, for example Hopper and Major (2007), are
now suggesting that NIS needs to be supplemented by
other theories, e.g., actor network theory, to understand
how actors within organisations shape organisational re-
sponses to institutional pressures (see also Lounsbury,
20084).
Taken together, NIE and the early NIS research indicate
that the various external pressures can influence the way
organisations are structured and governed. While NIE ex-
plores the economic pressures, NIS explores the institu-
tional pressures. However, although NIE and the early
NIS can help us understand the nature of the external
pressures on organisations, not all organisations will con-
form to these pressures in the same way and some orga-
nisations may be more responsive to some pressures
rather than others (see Oliver, 1991). So, to explain the
accounting practices of individual organisations we have
to look within those organisations. Some of the more re-
cent work in NIS is starting to look at how the agency of
multiple actors within organisations can construct what
is seen as legitimate in the institutional environment, as
well as within the organisation (for a review in the con-
text of performance measurement in the public sector see
Modell, 2009). For example, in a study of programme bud-
gets in a Dutch province, which were shaped by New
Public Management reforms in the Netherlands, Ter Bogt
and Van Helden (2011) explored how the new outcome-
oriented performance indicators are shaping new institu-
tionalised ways of thinking about budgeting. The focus of
such research is similar to the OIE inspired studies of
management accounting change which have been study-
ing organisational responses to institutional pressures
and resistance to change for almost 15 years. As we will
see below, this branch of OIE studies institutions within
organisations and focuses on the internal pressures and
constraints that shape management accounting practices.
4 Old Institutional Economics (OIE)5
As indicated above, NIE and the early NIS work look to
the broader external environment and explore how it
Thema
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shapes management accounting practices in organisa-
tions. However, to get a fuller understanding of the mish-
mash of inter-related influences it is essential to go inside
the organisations and study how specific management
accounting practices are shaped. While some NIS research-
ers are starting to look within organisations, other man-
agement accounting researchers have used OIE to provide
a framework for studying management accounting
change. To understand of the nature of OIE it will be
helpful if we first contrast old and new institutional eco-
nomics.5
Whereas NIE extends neoclassical economics, OIE starts by
questioning its basic assumptions. Instead of simply as-
suming bounded rationality and opportunism, OIE tries
to explain why people appear to be opportunistic, and
why particular types of economic behaviours are preva-
lent. It argues that behaviour within economic systems
(and also within organisations) is embedded in and
shaped by institutions. Whilst there is no generally agreed
definition of an institution, a commonly accepted defini-
tion used within OIE was set out as long ago as the 1930s
in an Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences: an institution is “a
way of thought or action of some prevalence and perma-
nence, which is embedded in the habits of a group or the
customs of people” (Hamilton, 1932; see Hodgson, 1993b).
In other words, institutions are the taken-for-granted
ways of thinking which underpin (economic) behaviour.
OIE has its origins in the work of the early American
institutionalists, especially Thorstein Veblen (e.g., 1898),
who critiqued the impact that large corporations were
having on social democracy in the US at the beginning of
the twentieth century. More recently, amid growing con-
cerns about the ability of neoclassical economics to ad-
dress contemporary economic problems, there has been a
resurgence of interest in (old) institutional economics,6
often combined with other perspectives, such as the beha-
vioural economics of Herbert Simon (e.g., 1955, 1959) and
the evolutionary economics of Nelson and Winter (see
1982). This work explores the way in which habits, rules
and routines structure economic activity, and importantly
how they evolve through time (Hodgson, 1993a). By
adopting an OIE perspective, management accounting can
be conceptualised as the rules and routines which shape
organisational activity. Burns and Scapens (2000) defined
rules as the formal statements of procedures and routines as
the (both formal and informal) procedures that are actu-
ally used. Building on these definitions, Burns and Sca-
pens (2000) developed a framework for studying manage-
ment accounting change.
This framework sees (management accounting) rules and
routines as the link between actions and institutions. In
other words, institutions, i.e., taken-for-granted ways of
thinking, underpin how people behave, although over
time actions can lead to changes in institutions. The rules
and routines reflect and put into action the taken-for-
granted ways of thinking in an organisation. On an on-
going basis, the actions follow the rules and routines,
although actions may also lead to changes in the rules
and routines - for instance as people adapt to new situa-
tions. Although rules and routines can be modified rela-
tively quickly, as the actors repeatedly undertake the ac-
tions, institutions tend to change more slowly, as it is
more difficult to change taken-for-granted ways of think-
ing. Central to the Burns and Scapens framework is the
notion that management accounting practices are part of
the rules and routines which enable organisational mem-
bers to make sense of their actions and the actions of
others. Over time as some individuals leave the organisa-
tion and new individuals replace them, the new indivi-
duals will learn how things are done within the organisa-
tion and come to share the taken-for-granted ways of
thinking.
This framework suggests that both the institutions and
the rules and routines can change over time, but in a
relatively slow, evolutionary way. However, Busco et al.
(2006) showed in a study of an Italian company acquired
by the US multinational General Electric (GE) that man-
agement accounting change can happen quite quickly - in
that case it could be considered revolutionary change.
However, the accounting change was accompanied by the
introduction of Six Sigma7 which built on the existing
quality-oriented ways of thinking. As such Six Sigma linked
the accounting changes to current ways of thinking in the
company (i.e., the prevailing institutions). So in that case
there was both evolution and revolution. There was a
revolutionary accounting change, but within it there
were also evolutionary processes building on the existing
quality-oriented ways of thinking. Thus, there were ele-
ments of stability within the process of change.
So it is important not to regard stability and change as
mutually exclusive - there can be elements of stability
within change, and change may be necessary if things are
to remain stable. Stability and change were also present in
a case study of a South East Asian oil company (see Siti-
Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). This company introduced
value-based management in the late 1990s. However, the
KPIs which were an essential part of the value-based man-
agement were used in a ceremonial way - i.e., something
that had to be done, but not something that was used to
manage the company. However, over time managers be-
gan to develop KPIs for their own use, but these were
different to the originally intended KPIs. Thus, despite
apparent initial resistance to value-based management,
there was change; however, not the change that the sys-
tem designers had intended. As such, there was both sta-
bility and change.
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To summarise, the Burns and Scapens framework empha-
sises that management accounting change is a continuous
process and it draws attention to the relationship between
actions, rules and routines, and the taken-for-granted
ways of thinking within the organisation. In contrast, in
NIS (including the more recent work) the focus is on ex-
ternal or ‘supra-organisational’ institutions: i.e., the insti-
tutions which shape activities at a social level or at the
organisational field (group of similar organisations) level.
Although Burns and Scapens (2000) recognise that ways of
thinking within an organisation will be shaped by such
external institutions, they point out that the specific his-
tory and experience of people within the organisation will
also shape the internal institutions. This notion of inter-
nal institutions has some similarities with the concept of
corporate culture in the organisation literature (see Busco
et al., 2002). The recognition that existing ways of thinking
within an organisation can influence processes of man-
agement accounting change has important implications
for the management of change. As we will see below, at-
tempts to introduce new management accounting sys-
tems and techniques, without carefully considering the
prevailing institutions within the organisation, may en-
counter resistance. Furthermore, the institutions shape
the character and content of the processes of change.
5 Managing management accounting change: an
institutional perspective
Burns et al. (2003) report a number of case studies of suc-
cessful and unsuccessful management accounting change.
However, they recognised that there can be no simple
prescriptions for coping with, or managing a programme
of accounting change. Solutions that prove successful in
one context, or at a particular point in time, cannot be
assumed to be appropriate for other companies and at
other times. Nevertheless, lessons can be learnt from these
cases and some (tentative) guidelines for coping with
management accounting (and broader organisational)
change can be suggested. One clear message from these
case studies is that institutions matter. The taken-for-
granted ways of thinking within an organisation can
have a direct and important impact on the success (or
failure) of a programme of change.
In two case studies of failure to implement a new ac-
counting system, the proposed system did not align with
the existing ways of thinking (i.e., the prevailing institu-
tions) and attempts were made to use incentives built
around the new accounting system to ‘force’ people to
change their ways of thinking. In one case, called RetailCo
in Burns et al. (2003)8 9, an attempt was made to introduce
economic value added (EVATM)10 and individual bonuses
were based on EVA figures. However, managers in this
company did not recognise the need to reflect the cost of
capital in their day-to-day decisions and did not see the
relevance of using EVA. Unfortunately, the accountants
emphasised the technical merits of the system and did
not recognise the differences in ways of thinking. This led
to tensions between the managers and the accountants
and to resistance to EVA which eventually led to the sys-
tem being abandoned.
In two cases of successful management accounting change
Burns et al. (2003) showed that there were changes in ways
of thinking, or at least a recognition of the need to change
ways of thinking, prior to the introduction of the new
accounting system which was then offered as a way to
cope with the need to change ways of thinking. For exam-
ple, in a case called Polymer in Burns et al. (2003)11 the
senior management recognised the need to replace its in-
ternally focused production orientation with a more ex-
ternally focused customer orientation. It then instituted a
programme to change the focus/orientation within the
company. As well as extensive staff training, everyone was
encouraged to contribute to the creation of a new vision
statement and five year plan. Only then was a new set of
management planning and reporting tools introduced,
tools which were intended to assist in achieving this vi-
sion and five year plan.
In the cases of success the need to change existing ways of
thinking (i.e., to change the prevailing institutions) was
explicitly recognised at the outset and these existing ways
of thinking were challenged. Although the need to change
could be considered to be a ‘problem’, the new account-
ing/management systems were offered as a way of addres-
sing that problem. However, in the unsuccessful cases the
management accounting systems were used as a way of
forcing people to change their ways of thinking. As the
new systems did not align with existing ways of thinking
it was difficult for people to understand and accept them,
and this created tensions between the accountants and
the managers. As a result, the new accounting systems
came to be seen as ‘the problem’, and were eventually
withdrawn. These cases illustrate the difficulties of intro-
ducing new accounting systems which conflict with exist-
ing institutions, especially if the purpose of the new sys-
tems is to ‘force’ people to change their ways of thinking.
This does not mean that such new systems should not be
introduced, but it suggests that initiatives designed to
explicitly challenge/change existing ways of thinking
should accompany or preferably precede the introduction
of the new accounting systems.
Burns et al. (2003) recommended the following questions
should be asked when embarking on a programme of
management accounting change (Burns et al., 2003, p. 45):
∙ What are the company’s taken-for-granted ways of
thinking, and how internally consistent are they?
∙ Where do these taken-for-granted ways of thinking
come from?
∙ How are these ways of thinking reproduced and rein-
forced - for example, are they encouraged by existing
incentive schemes?
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∙ Who are the powerful groups within the company and
what are their taken-for-granted ways of thinking?
∙ Are these taken-for-granted ways of thinking poten-
tially incompatible with the new systems within the
change programme?
By asking these questions, those responsible for imple-
menting management accounting change can anticipate
potential problems and sources of resistance, and where
necessary initiatives which directly challenge and then
change the prevailing institutions could be introduced.
This illustrates the importance and practical implications
of understanding the role of institutions in processes of
management accounting change.
6 Concluding comments
As indicated earlier, management accounting change is a
complex and multi-dimensional process, and the evolu-
tion of management accounting practices is subject to a
mish-mash of inter-related influences. However, the three
different types of institutional theory – NIE, NIS and
OIE – can help in understanding some of this mish-mash
of inter-related influences. NIE in general, and TCE in
particular, can be used to explain how the nature of eco-
nomic transactions can influence governance structures
and control systems, including management accounting
practices. The early NIS perspective provides insights into
how social and political dimensions of the environment
can influence management accounting practices within
organisations. However, the approaches taken in the later
NIS work, and also in the OIE inspired management ac-
counting research, are needed in order to explain the or-
ganisational processes through which management ac-
counting practices evolve and can be changed.
All three types of institutional theory emphasise that in-
stitutions matter, although they are seen in somewhat dif-
ferent ways in each. In NIE they constrain economic activ-
ities and shape governance structures. In NIS they embed
the social and political norms and values to which organi-
sations have to conform if they are to be seen as legiti-
mate by their broader constituencies and stakeholders.
Finally, in OIE they are the taken-for-granted ways of
thinking within an organisation, which need to be recog-
nised and where necessary challenged in managing pro-
cesses of change and in implementing new management
accounting systems. Together the various types of institu-
tional theory have made important contributions to man-
agement accounting research and especially research into
processes of management accounting change.
Notes
1 This comment was cited in Scapens and
Roberts (1993, p. 1).
2 Moral hazard occurs when the principal (su-
perior) is unable to directly monitor or even infer
the behaviour of the agent (subordinate) as the
agent possesses information which is not avail-
able to the principal and adverse selection occurs
when the agent (subordinate) claims to have
knowledge and skills which the principal (supe-
rior) is unable to verify.
3 This conference paper of Hodgson was cited
by Dequech (2002, p. 567).
4 Although Lounsbury is a management (not a
management accounting) researcher, he called
on accounting researchers to study actors within
organisations using, for instance, actor network
theory to supplement NIS (Lounsbury, 2008).
5 For an extended discussion of the use of
OIE in management accounting research – its
achievements, extensions and limitations – see
Scapens (2006).
6 While we will refer to this resurgence of
interest in (old) institutional economics as OIE, it
is sometimes also called Neo-Old Institutional
Economics to emphasise its contemporary nature
(see Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006).
7 Six Sigma is a package of quality improve-
ment techniques which include financial evalua-
tions of the proposed quality improvement initia-
tives.
8 Burns et al. (2003) used pseudonyms for
most of the case studies.
9 For an extended and more theoretically in-
formed discussion of this case study see
Ezzamel and Burns (2005).
10 EVA is a registered trade mark of Stern
Stewart & Co.
11 See Jazayeri and Hopper (1999).
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